Introduction
The term indonesianisasi stands for the removal of Dutch tutelage and a subsequent fundamental reorientation of the economy of Indonesia at the time of decolonisation and during the years immediately after Dutch acknowledgement of Indonesian independence in December 1949. The term was initially used in a narrow sense designating the replacement of Dutch officials and managers by Indonesian nationals in the government bureaucracy and private firms in Indonesia during the years leading up to the nationalization of remaining Dutch business assets in Indonesia in December 1957. There is a growing appreciation that the term needs to be applied in a broader sense as the transfer of economic leadership in newly independent Indonesia had profound consequences for future economic development and also occurred within a wider context of structural change. This paper forms a first exploration of the application of the term indonesianisasi in such a broad sense. It should be emphasized, therefore, that this is a startingpoint of new research rather than the outcome of a completed undertaking.
Chronology is always at the forefront of the historian's mind. Whereas there can be doubt about the decisive turning-point in Indonesian political history, i.e. the proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945, it is not self-evident that the fundamental change in the course of economic history can be pinned down to one specific event or year. As Dick argues, the collapse of the colonial export-based economy in the 1930s signalled a decisive break with the past forcing Indonesian into a very different path of economic development that in fact only culminated with the rise of manufacturing in the 1980s and 1990s (cf. Dick et al. 2002: 153-154) .
It can similarly be argued that the Indonesian Revolution was only fully completed with the expulsion of remaining Dutch nationals in 1957/58, i.e. several years after the collapse of the colonial state in the 1940s. These two extremes, the early 1930s and the late 1950s, underscore that economic change constituted a gradual process embracing several decades. It is one aim of this paper to demonstrate that indonesianisasi needs to be conceived as such a long-run process of economic change.
The Indonesian economy at the time of independence was of a highly dualistic nature with the modern sector still largely controlled by Dutch business interests and strongly oriented towards exports of primary commodities for which terms of trade had been deteriorating for some time already (Dick et al. 2002: 174) . This represented a path of economic development, which did not possess much long-run viability. European investment was soon to be replaced by American, eventually also East Asian capital and management. In export production, the emphasis was to shift away from agricultural crops to oil, including refined products, eventually also to non-oil manufacturing goods. These were major changes that gave the Indonesian economy a decidedly different character within not much more than about half a century, from the 1930s to the 1980s.
It is another aim of this paper to demonstrate that the process of indonesianisasi must be considered within the framework of such a long-run fundamental reorientation of the Indonesian economy.
Research on indonesianisasi is greatly facilitated by the early and very elaborate Ph.D. -increased participation in the management of alien companies, -return of landholdings by alien enterprises to the Indonesian community (Sutter 1959: 2) .
Not all nine forms of indonesianisasi can obviously be dealt with in detail here. Attention will be given in particular to the establishment of new private enterprises, efforts to increase Several approaches to a further analysis of the process of indonesianisasi are explored here and arranged into five brief sections concerning respectively early ventures in this direction (section 2), official macroeconomic policies of the Indonesian government (section 3), changes in economic structure (section 4), changes in the business environment after independence (section 5), and, finally, the fate of remaining foreign, especially Dutch enterprises up to 1957/58 (section 6).
Early initiatives
Examples of successful indigenous entrepreneurships in colonial Indonesia are manifold and clearly modify the stereotype conventional i mage of a dichotomy between modern, Western and traditional, Asian modes of production. Space limitations only permit us to draw attention to the vast numbers of indigenous rubber and copra planters in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi reaping the fruits from favourable conditions in foreign markets during the early decades of the twentieth century as well as to the hundreds of cooperatives in rural Java that were established, often in conjunction with the Indonesian nationalist movement, during the 1910s, 1 920s and 1930s. Other, perhaps less well known examples foreshadowed the eventual transfer of economic leadership. The susuhunan of Surakarta ran his own sugar estates on the lands of the sultanate in Solo. Kudus in Central Java was traditionally known as the `kingdom of kretek' (the tobacco used for local Indonesian cigarettes) with a Javanese entrepreneur, Nitisemito, successfully competing with Chinese manufacturers, at any rate up to the 1940s. The first indigenous commercial bank, BNI (Bank Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Bank), was founded by local businessmen in Surabaya in 1929. The belated efforts at industrialization on the part of the Dutch colonial government, that only materialized towards the end of the 1930s, included the support of indigenous textile factories in both Majalaya (West Java) and Bagnil (East Java). Although scattered and locally oriented in their operations, such enterprises served as a breeding-ground for future economic leadership.
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The Japanese occupation not only offered opportunities for the nationalist movement to prepare for independence but also encouraged indigenous business, often in co-operation with Japanese private firms (Post1997).
A first wave of establishing indigenous enterprises followed immediately after the proclamation of independence. (Muhaimin 1990: 31) .
A second wave of establishment of new indigenous firms followed in the early 1950s, after (Muhaimin 1990: 227-233) .
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This brief survey may suffice to indicate that the process of indonesianisasi had its roots before the Second World War and that the indonesianisasi during the Sukarno period could draw on a rich tradition of indigenous entrepreneurship. The remainder of this paper will focus on the 1950s.
Economic policy
One of the most controversial elements of economic policy during the early Sukarno period was the so-called Benteng (fortress) program, introduced in April 1950 and officially abandoned in 1957. The explicit intention was to foster the creation of a class of indigenous Indonesian businessmen but it became a national scandal and allegedly did much to discredit the very idea of free private enterprise in Indonesia (cf. Dick et al. 2002: 178 `national importer' (Muhaimin 1990: 78, 81, 156-157; see also Feith 1962 : 364-275, Bondan 2001 . More importantly, however, by early 1955, the director of the KPUI, Ahmad Ponsen, estimated that only 50 of the indigenous firms could be labelled `bonafide' whereas another 200 had only marginal operations (Sutter 1959 (Sutter : 1018 (Sutter -1022 . By implication, 90 % of the listed import firms in fact served as front men for either Chinese or foreign traders. The publication of these statistics and the subsequent public criticism of the `quick-gain' attitude among indigenous Indonesian businessmen, especially by Vice President Hatta, signified the failure of the entire program.
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The failure of the Benteng program had far -reaching consequences. In terms of political economy, the implementation of the program fostered new alliances between political power holders and private capitalists, i.e. between government officials, whether bureaucrats or military, one the one hand and Chinese businessmen in particular (Castles 1967: 11 ; for repercussions during the early New Order period, see Dorodjatun 1979 , Liem 1976 , Robison 1977 , 1986 . It has been argued that the program's very failure paved the way for the nationalization of remaining Dutch enterprises in 1957/58 (Anspach 1969: 169) . I shall return to that matter in due course (section 6 below).
Economic structure
The not only concern patterns of ownership, i.e. Dutch against Indonesian or indigenous predominance in economic life, but also economic structure, i.e. the composition of national product and employment by sector. Dutch colonial rule was held responsible for the excessive dependence on world markets for primary goods and the subsequent neglect of development of an industrial sector. Late colonial rule had witnessed a spectacular export-led economic expansion but Indonesia was still left distressingly poor at independence. A modernization in terms of economic structure had scarcely taken place but such an achievement would probably have been incompatible with the very institution of colonial rule (Dick et al. 2002: 144-145 ).
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The answer to the problem of how to sustain economic growth was of course industrialization.
Despite a professed ambition in this direction already at the time of the formulation of the Ethical Policy in the early twentieth century, not much was undertaken in this regard by the Dutch 4 Further research will have to disclose whether such insights played an important role in the public discourse on national economic development during the early Sukarno years. (Booth 1998: 88; Dick et al. 2002: 159-162) .
Industrialization policies were resumed after the Sukarno government had gained full control over the country. It is instructive to review the situation in Indonesian manufacturing as it had developed by 1954. This is done by looking at the distribution of manufacturing employment across branches of production, numbers of manufacturing firms as well as the geographical distribution over the archipelago (Figures 1-3 ; source: BPS 1956: 2 -3, 10-11). A distinction is made between large firms (at least 50 employees) and medium-size firms (10-<50 employees).
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Taken together, some 1800 large enterprises employed more than one quarter of a million workers corresponding to 55 % of total employment in large and medium-size manufacturing.
The average size of a `large' firm was 144 employees against only 23 on average in medium-size firms (BPS 1956: 10-11) . Although manufacturing accounted for only a very tiny proportion of the total labour force in Indonesia at the time (cf. Dick et al. 2002: 199) , these aggregates do
show that the process of industrialization regained its momentum very shortly after conditions had become more conducive for economic structural change.
Three out of five Indonesians working in manufacturing were found in a handful of traditional and highly labour-intensive branches such as Footwear, Tobacco, Textiles and Food products, in that order (Figure 1 ). Three of these branches (Tobacco, Textiles and Food) accounted for more than one half of all employment in large manufacturing firms whereas Footwear (in fact including some ancillary textiles as well) offered by far the most employment among mediumsize firms. 6 More capital-intensive lines of production, as found in Chemicals, Metals, Nonmetals, Machinery, Electrical appliances and Transport equipment (including motor cars), offered employment for less than one quarter of the total manufacturing labour in large and medium-size firms. Such characteristics underscore that industrialization in Indonesia by the early 1950s had scarcely advanced beyond the very initial stage of labour -intensive import substitution.
The overall impression of a limited range of manufacturing production is also borne out by the distribution of the number of firms over individual industries (Figure 2 ). There was a proliferation of enterprises in a relatively small number of industries, notably Food, Tobacco,
Textiles and Printing among large firms and the former two of these four among medium-size firms. 7 Some 250 firms can be considered very large with employment in excess of 250 persons and of these only 28 had more than 1000 employees on the payroll. Firms within the tiny lastmentioned category were primarily found in Tobacco, Textiles and Transport equipment (car and bicycle manufacturing). Large-scale mechanization was clearly still quite exceptional in Indonesian industrial production of the 1950s.
Spatial dispersion in manufacturing was highly skewed with an excessive predominance of Java as opposed to the other islands. West Java accommodated 30 % of all large and medium-size firms in manufacturing whereas Central Java and East Java were good for 25 % each. Outside Java, only North Sumatra (the former East Sumatra of the colonial period) housed more than a trivial number of manufacturing establishments. The overall rank order of regions among manufacturing firms was mirrored in virtually all individual branches of industrial production ( Figure 3) . 8 Although boosting the highest percentage of establishments within most branches, West Java was in this respect usually closed followed by East Java. There were, however, some interesting exceptions to the rule. Tobacco had its centre in Central Java, especially Kudus, Wood was concentrated to Sumatra, Rubber was evenly distributed over West Java, East Java and Sumatra (especially Deli) while Furniture was equally important in all three provinces of Java.
6 There appears to be some inconsistency in the application of the selection criteria with regard to small firms in the branch labelled Footwear, but in fact also including some ancillary textiles production. It is likely that the high figure for employment in this branch is inflat ed by inclusion of numerous firms with less than 10 employees each.
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The unbalanced geographical pattern of manufacturing establishments again tells us that industrialization was certainly under its way yet still in its infancy.
The very rationale behind mechanization is obviously to raise labour productivity but it is very difficult to measure such gains unless we have data on the value of industrial output. Indonesianisasi and industrialization were two processes of fundamental structural change that gained momentum at approximately the same time. The link between the two remains a hitherto little explored matter. Did they reinforce each other or did they occur in virtual isolation from one another?
A new business environment
In his impressive survey of Indonesian politics and economics in the 1940s and early 1950s, Sutter concludes that already by the mid-1950s a sizeable group of indigenous Indonesian 9 Examples can only be given for branches of industry where the output is homogenous.
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entrepreneurs had emerged whose activities were by no means confined to small-scale operations on the local level (Sutter 1959 (Sutter : 1238 . This is an important observation because it questions the idea that the nationaliza tion of foreign, especially Dutch enterprises was a necessary precondition for the transfer of economic leadership in Indonesia. Or, in other words, that the failure of the Benteng program implied a failure in terms of indonesianisasi on other frontiers as well. Sutter's observation also mitigates the conventional conception that the Indonesian economy remained almost exclusively dualistic up to the draconic measures taken by the Sukarno government in the latter part of its rule. The recapitulation of the historical roots of indonesianisasi above (section 2) pointed in the same direction but here the implications bring us one step further. The process of indonesianisasi had not only started earlier than what has often been thought but more had also been achieved than is usually appreciated. It is a subtle distinction but an important one.
Sutter's basic contention is that a new kind of business environment was evolving in Indonesia already in the early 1950s, alongside, as a result of or perhaps even despite the ill-reputed 14 industry and another 221 in non-trading services (Business 1953) . 12 Although the information on each individual firm is very scant, consisting only of the firm's name, the address of its head office, the location of its branches and its banking contact, it is usually possible to infer the ethnic identity of owners or managers from the firm's name. Assigning ethnicity in this manner was relatively clear-cut in a large number of cases, including the following:
(1) Firms using distinctly indigenous Indonesian personal names (Javanese, Sundanese etc.) or business labels in the Indonesian language (unless in combination with overtly non-indigenous personal names) or labels containing unambiguous cultural references to for instance Islam or the nationalist movement;
(2) All firms using Chinese personal names; 
Yet a similar line of argument does not apply to industrial firms that were unaffected by the Benteng program where the share of indigenous firms is only slightly lower. The overall picture, 13 The impact of the `Ali Baba' factor on these results largely depends on whether the information on individual companies reflects the situation at the beginning or the end of the year 1953. The fact that the date of printing of the directory is given as 1953 lends support to the former alternative, which implies that distortions due to `Ali Baba'
constructions may be limited.
therefore, demonstrates that the business environment indeed looked radically different from the one that had prevailed at the end of the period of colonial rule when indigenous Indonesian firms were far and few between (Lindblad 1998:74, 78 ).
Next to the discontinuity with regard to the part played by indigenous businessmen, there was also an essential continuity compared to the colonial past as represented by the strong position of Chinese firms, in trading and to an even greater extent in manufacturing where the Chinese enterprises ranked above the indigenous ones (36 % against 33 %). The true `losers' in the process of indonesianisasi during the early Sukarno period were not Chinese firms but Dutch ones, especially the numerous small firms fitting into a category best labelled `NetherlandsIndian' in the situation prevailing up to 1942, i.e. firms with a local head office and an orientation towards local economy that were owned and managed by members of the permanent Dutch settlement in the colony. Remaining Dutch firms, which in numbers ranked below indigenous and Chinese ones in both trading and manufacturing, counted several large Dutch enterprises managed from the Netherlands. Other firms, with a non-Dutch international or undetermined ethnic status, formed a rather marginal category in the grand total.
Services other than trading had been affected by early indonesianisasi in a slightly different way. Indonesian predominance was already pronounced, at any rate as measured by numbers of individual firms, in banking and publishing; 13 out of 19 registered banks were Indonesian whereas 68 out of 83 newspapers or journals had an indigenous signature. In shipping and insurance, however, Dutch firms or firms with an international image, judging from the Englishlanguage label, still ranked above distinctly Indonesian companies. There were only five unambiguously Indonesian (including one Chinese) insurance companies in a total of 25 and less than one -half of the 16 firms engaged in interisland shipping were Indonesian. 14 These data underline that indonesianisasi was occurring, as may be expected, primarily within the domestic economy.
The fate of Dutch firms
The attit ude of the Sukarno government vis-à-vis foreign, especially Dutch business interests was highly ambivalent. It was publicly admitted that foreign capital and management had an important role to play in strategies for economic development of independent Indonesia (see for instance the speech by Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo in February 1954; Berita Ekonomi, 20 February 1954) . Meanwhile business conditions for foreign firms continued to deteriorate, a development for which the government can at least in part be held responsible. Currency controls and a complex system of multiple exchange rates impaired transactions with foreign owners and suppliers of inputs. Wage demands from increasingly militant labour organizations raised costs of production while thefts and land occupations formed additional obstacles for foreign-owned agricultural estates in particular. Yet prospects for Indonesian export products in international markets remained favourable for the time being and profitability was high. It is estimated that Dutch firms remitted a total of 800 million guilders between 1954 and 1957 alone (Meijer 1994: 529) . Such massive transfers of profits testified to a short-run perspective in management strategies of the Dutch enterprises and clearly added to Indonesian apprehension about their continued operations in Indonesia.
Relations with Dutch firms in particular were in the first place soured by the on-going conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands over `the return of Irian Barat' (West New Guinea) as it was labelled in the Indonesian press. It is highly likely that the very aftermath of decolonisation played a role as well. As Dick argues, the terms under which Indonesia gained independence were exceptionally harsh with the apparatus of the colonial state being dismantled, in 1950-1952, largely at Indonesian expense (Dick et al. 2002: 170-171) . Although rarely acknowledged in the international or Dutch literature, it does make it easier to understand why it did not prove possible to forge a new kind of partnership between former colonizer and former colony in the same way as did happen in neighbouring former colonies such as the Philippines and Malaysia.
Increasing Indonesian apprehension was matched by a firm belief on the part of remaining The ex post legitimisation of the takeovers by the Sukarno government is especially interesting when it comes to better understand the nationalization of Dutch enterprises in December 1957. In the statement issued after the special cabinet session on 5 December, it was acknowledged that the actions formed the expression of a spirit (semangat) which had been gathering momentum for a long time now turning into a flood' (banjir) and that it was the government's responsibility to canalise such sentiments into a orderly and disciplined national capacity ( potensi nasional) to reach the final goal, i.e. the `return' of Irian Barat ( Pikiran Rakyat, 6 December 1957) . Such a statement lends credence to the idea that the nationalization of Dutch firms formed the logical, perhaps inevitable outcome of a successive change of climate in the public discourse on foreign control of large parts of the Indonesian economy.
Direct causal links between the nationalization of Dutch business and overt government policies appear less convincing. The argument that the failure of the Benteng program caused the takeovers (section 3 above) suffers from the need to explain why a gestation period of more than three years was needed for effects to materialize -after all, the Benteng program was known to be a failure already by 1954. The very fact that the takeovers were apparently not orchestrated by the government makes it difficult to view the nationalization as part of Indonesian foreign policy, which, needless to say, does not preclude that the Sukarno government was quick to use the actions, once they had taken place, as a means of confrontation with the Dutch in the Irian conflict. The f eeling of immediate and urgent crisis at the time must be considered as well. As
Bondan concludes in his insightful analysis of the event, the Dutch firms still operating in Indonesia easily became the scapegoat (kambing hitam) for all problems at the moment (semua persoalan yang ada) (Bondan 201: 106).
The immediate aftermath of the wave of takeovers is also instructive to consider. It appears less than coincidental that already on 11 December 1957, a final agreement was reached with the Japanese government on a very substantial package of financial aid to Indonesia, in total amounting to $ 400 million. On 19 December, the Indonesian Parliament determined that the profits over 1957 confiscated from Dutch firms were to be used to cover the deficit in the government's budget over the same year. 
Conclusion
This contribution has served to demonstrate the importance of studying indonesianisasi as a gradual process extending over several decades fitting into a wider context of economic and social change in Indonesia at the time of transition from colony to nation-state. Several avenues of analysis have been explored. Preliminary observations are as follows:
(1) The historical roots of indonesianisasi may be found in instances of indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurship during the late colonial period t hus offering a measure of continuity over time that needs to be fully appreciated. These observations may provide an agenda for further research on the highly fascinating topic of indonesianisasi as an integral part of a dramatic transition in modern Indonesian history.
